Nevertheless, it should not be particularly controversial that legal theory is evaluative in this way. To understand why, distinguish between (a) thick judgment claims that presuppose some kind of moral goodness, or perhaps a value of an object considered as all, and (b) thin evaluative claims that don`t. (This distinction roughly follows Julie Dickson`s distinction between directly evaluative sentences and indirect evaluative statements. See Dickson 2001, pp. 51–55.) Thus, the simplest thick evaluative claims have the form: (X) is morally [all considered] good [bad]. Such claims can also be comparative in nature, so they have the form: (X) is morally better [worse] than (Y). In contrast, allegations of thin judgment judge the extent to which an element compares to a standard that is considered neither moral nor prescriptive. Such claims also do not contain thick evaluative claims. Examples of thin evaluative claims would therefore be “(X) is important” and “(X) is interesting”. Even if legal theorists must make thin claims of judgment in order to begin the project of developing a first-rate legal theory, this does not mean that they must make thick judgment claims. Finally, one could construct a theory that captures a range of legal phenomena considered central or important, while remaining agnostic about the value of these phenomena themselves. While this line of thinking plausibly shows that legal theory requires the assumption of certain evaluative claims, it obviously does not show that legal theory necessarily includes thick judgment claims (Dickson 2001, 114-125). Claims of the form “the function of (X) is (F)” are of course classified with “(X) is important” (or more precisely, “(X) is important for a specific purpose (Y)”) as thin evaluative claims.
Accordingly, the assertion that the function of law is (F) obviously does not imply thick evaluative assertions about the law. After all, it is not obvious why assigning a function to something requires the conviction that the performance of that function is either quite considered or morally good. The attribution of a function to the law does not therefore necessarily have to give rise to thick claims of evaluation. An established legal truth or statement so clear that it cannot set a precedent has been influenced by two main methods of understanding the relevant intuitions (or data) that legal theories seek to systematize. This, in turn, is because you can understand the concepts themselves and our intuitions about them in two different ways. As a result, we find two main variants of the conceptual analysis vision of methodology. This technique seems to be closely related to the private arrangement method. It deals with the formation of legal entities, which is its main feature. It includes all laws relating to the registration of companies and organizations. Article 37 of the Companies and Related Matters Act stipulates that when a company is incorporated, it becomes a legal person.
Remarkably, the first premise of Dworkin`s general argument is highly questionable. Some legal philosophers have argued that legal reasoning is not interpreted as fully as Dworkin assumes. According to this view, which has long been supported by H.L.A. Hart (1961, chapter 7), interpretation is an exception to standard understanding of language and communication, which only becomes necessary when the law is unclear for some reason. In most common cases, however, the law can be easily understood and applied without mediating interpretations (Marmor 2011, Chapter 6). In the last two decades of the 20th century, new challenges to general jurisprudence and legal positivism in particular took an interesting methodological turn. This methodological change accelerated with the publication of Dworkin`s Law`s Empire (1986), which argued that not only is law as a social practice profoundly interpretive (and therefore partial, but necessarily evaluative) in nature, but that any theory of the nature of law is also interpretative and therefore also evaluative. Many who do not necessarily share Dworkin`s views on the interpretive character of legal practice or the specifics of his theory of interpretation have joined him in this methodological skepticism of the traditional goals of general jurisprudence, that is, the possibility of developing a theory about this nature of law that would have universal validity and remain morally neutral. These methodological challenges and others arising from them for traditional general jurisprudence are discussed in the following section.
However, it would be fair to say that in recent years, many legal philosophers have expressed growing frustration with these traditional debates about the nature of law, calling on the philosophy of law to go beyond the Hart-Dworkin debates and explore new avenues of research.